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Abstract.We study a simple, tractable model of labor adjust-
ment in a trade model that allows us to analyze the economy’s
dynamic response to trade liberalization. Since it is a neoclassical
market-clearing model, we can use duality techniques to study the
equilibrium, and despite its simplicity a rich variety of properties
emerge. The model generates gross ﬂows of labor across indus-
tries, even in the steady state; persistent wage diﬀerentials across
industries; gradual adjustment to a liberalization; and anticipatory
adjustment to a pre-announced liberalization. Pre-announcement
makes liberalization less attractive to export-sector workers and
more attractive to import-sector workers, eventually making work-
ers unanimous either in favor of or in opposition to liberalization.
Based on these results, we identify many pitfalls to conventional
methods of empirical study of trade liberalization that are based
on static models.
1 Introduction.
This paper presents a model of labor mobility incorporated into a simple
trade model. The goal is to provide a general-equilibrium framework that is
rich enough to capture the main empirical features of labor mobility in practice
and yet simple enough to be tractable with the tools of analysis familiar to
trade economists. We thus hope that this framework can become a useful part
of a trade economist’s toolkit.
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1All aspects of an economy’s response to trade policy, and particularly the
distributional aspects, depend crucially on how labor adjusts, and the costs
workers face in doing so (see Davidson and Matusz (2004), Slaughter (1998),
and Magee (1989) for extensive discussions of the distributional implications).
However, for the most part trade theory has ignored the question of labor mo-
bility, assuming either frictionless mobility or complete immobility. Moreover,
most of the few existing theoretical treatments of labor mobility are hard to
reconcile with key empirical features of labor mobility, in particular with the
evidence on gross ﬂows. Here, we set up a model that takes on these questions
head on.
One can identify three ways in which trade theorists have handled labor
adjustment in trade models. First is the traditional static approach used as
a benchmark by many trade economists, which uses a model with ‘speciﬁc
factors,’ factors that cannot adjust at all, for analysis of the short run, but a
model with frictionless adjustment for analysis of the long run. Mussa (1974),
for example, uses the ‘Ricardo-Viner’ model for the short run, which features
instantaneous adjustment for labor but no adjustment for any other factors,
and the Heckscher-Ohlin model, which assumes no mobility costs for any fac-
tor, for the long-run. Of course, this approach oﬀers no insight into dynamics,
and assumes away mobility costs for workers.
Second are explicitly dynamic models with only net ﬂows, such as Mussa’s
(1978) seminal model of intersectoral capital adjustment, in which adjustment
is gradual because of convex adjustment costs for capital. A similar approach
has sometimes been adopted for labor, by stipulating convex retraining costs,
as in Karp and Paul (1994) and Dehejia (1997). A feature of these models is
that marginal adjustment costs are assumed to be zero when net movements of
labor are zero, and so the long-run steady-state is the same as in a model with
no adjustment costs (as in Heckscher-Ohlin). Dixit and Rob (1994) present
a model with a constant cost to switching sectors, equal for all workers, in a
stochastic environment. Feenstra and Lewis (1994) use a one-period model of
worker adjustment to study compensation policies. Matsuyama (1992) models
intergenerational labor adjustment.
All of the above papers have the property that all workers who switch
sectors move in the same direction: Gross ﬂows always equal net ﬂows. This
is a problem, since empirically gross ﬂows of labor tend to be an order of
magnitude larger than net ﬂows (see Artu¸ c, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007), or
Jovanovic and Moﬃtt(1990), Table 1). The third approach meets this diﬃculty
by adopting search models of labor reallocation to a trade model. Hosios
(1990), Davidson, Martin and Matusz (1999), and Davidson and Matusz (2001)
explore diﬀerent aspects of this type of model, in which reallocation in response
to liberalization is gradual because it takes time for workers to ﬁnd jobs in the
expanding sector. A survey of this approach with much discussion of empirical
evidence is Davidson and Matusz (2004).
What we do in this paper is to develop a perfect-foresight neoclassical
model of labor adjustment within a simple trade model, which does generate
2gross ﬂows in excess of net ﬂows, as the search models do, but does so through
idiosyncratic shocks to workers’ mobility costs rather than through search.
This has the advantage that it allows us to use the powerful tools of duality
theory, well known in trade theory, to derive a wide variety of analytical results
not only about the steady state but also about the whole transition path. We
thus combine a desirable feature of the neoclassical models (duality) with a
desirable property of the search models (gross ﬂows).
This is a simpliﬁed and more tractable version of a more general model pre-
sented in Cameron, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007). The general version is
stochastic, can accommodate any number of industries and geographic regions
within the country under study, and has the virtue that its main parameters
can be econometrically estimated, as described in that paper. Here, we focus
on the implications of the model for trade theory in a simple two-sector special
case with one type of labor, which is simple and intuitive to use. A compan-
ion paper (Artu¸ c, Chaudhuri and McLaren (Forthcoming)) studies the model
through numerical simulations, and Artu¸ c, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) es-
timates the structural parameters of the model and simulates the adjustment
process.
The main results from this paper are:
(i) Gross ﬂows of labor always exceed net ﬂows, so there are always workers
moving across sectors, even in the steady state.
(ii) Equilibrium is unique, and there is no hysteresis, despite the presence
of an unavoidable ﬁxed cost to switching sectors.
(iii) Wage diﬀerentials persist across locations or sectors even in the long
run, despite the fact that there are always some workers changing sectors.
In particular, cancellation of a sector’s tariﬀ protection leads not only to a
short-run drop in that sector’s wage relative to the other sector, but also to a
(smaller but still positive) drop in its relative wage in the long run. Thus, a
frictionless model is not a good predictor for the steady state behavior of the
model.
(iv) The economy adjusts only gradually to changes in policy. This is
consistent with ﬁndings by Topel (1986), Blanchard & Katz (1992), and others.
This complicates empirical work on trade and wages, however, because changes
in wages and labor allocation will continue long after the change in policy has
occurred.
(v) The economy begins to adjust to a policy change as soon as it is antic-
ipated. Evidence of this has been noted in data on trade agreements (Freund
and McLaren (1999)). This complicates empirical work even more, because it
means that adjustment begins before the policy change takes eﬀect, and in fact
changes in wages can reverse their direction when the policy change actually
is executed.
(vi) The incidence of trade policy needs to be analyzed on the basis of
lifetime utility, taking worker mobility and option value into account, and not
simply on the basis of wage levels. We show how to do this. The correction
is important: It is theoretically possible, for example, for a policy change to
3lower real wages in a sector both in the short run and in the long run, and
yet for the workers in the sector to be better oﬀ as a result of it, because it
raises those workers’ option value. This is far from being only a theoretical
possibility, as Artu¸ c, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) show using US worker
data.
(vii) Announcing a trade liberalization in advance tends to reduce the
diﬀerence between its eﬀect on export-sector workers and its eﬀect on import-
competing workers. We show that this leads to worker unanimity in the limit,
meaning that all workers agree on the desirability of the liberalization if it
is announced far enough in advance. However, it is crucial to note that this
can have the eﬀect in the limit of making all workers beneﬁciaries of trade
liberalization or of making them all net losers from it. Thus, the common pre-
sumption that a phased-in liberalization helps to cushion the blow to aﬀected
workers can be exactly wrong in some cases. We oﬀer a simple condition that
determines which way it will go.
Note that the hazards that these properties present for empirical work are
eliminated if one estimates the structural parameters of a dynamic model and
uses it as the basis for policy simulations. That is the approach taken in Artu¸ c,
Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007).
Plan of paper: The following section lays out the basic model. Then one
section presents results on the steady state of the model, and the following
section presents results on dynamic adjustment. A further section discusses
the incidence of policy changes in the model, taking lifetime utility into ac-
count, and analyzes the eﬀect of pre-announcement of liberalization on the
distribution of gains and losses. A ﬁnal section summarizes.
2 The Basic Model.
There are two sectors, X and Y, each with a large number of competitive
employers, who combine a sector-speciﬁc ﬁxed (latent) factor with labor for
production. The two sectors may be located in two separate regions and may
require diﬀerent skills, making it costly for workers to move between them.
Without any costs of moving between sectors, and without any idiosyncratic
shocks to workers, the economy would be a Ricardo-Viner model (Jones, 1971).
We shall see that its equilibrium is very diﬀerent from that model, both in its
dynamic character and in its steady state.
The economy’s workers form a continuum of measure L.
2.1 Production.








t denotes labor used in sector i in period t. Assume that Qi(·) is
increasing, continuously diﬀerentiable, and strictly concave.
The domestic price of good i, pi, is treated as exogenous. A central exam-
ple, which will be treated explicitly, is of a small open economy in which the
domestic price is equal to the given world price plus a tariﬀ (export subsidy)
for a good that is imported (exported). For now, we will assume that domestic
goods prices are constant over time, but later we will extend the analysis to
the case of an unanticipated or anticipated change due to a trade liberaliza-
tion. Cameron, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) and Artu¸ c, Chaudhuri and
McLaren (2007) allow for the more general case of a stochastic process for
domestic prices.










t denotes the nominal wage paid by sector i at time t and pi denotes
the domestic price of good i. Thus, the competitive employers in each sector
each take the wage as given and maximize proﬁt; the wage adjusts so that this
wage just clears the spot labor market in that sector.
2.2 Labor Mobility.
A worker θ who is in industry i at the end of period t receives a non-pecuniary
beneﬁt εi
θ,t. This can be thought of as enjoyment of the work or of living in
the region where industry i is located, for example. We assume that the εi
θ,t
are independently and identically distributed across workers and sectors and
over time, with cdf F(·), pdf f(·), and full support:





The cost to a worker θ, who was in i during period t, of moving from i to j 6= i






where C ≥ 0 is the deterministic component of mobility costs, common to
all workers (such as retraining or relocation costs, or psychic costs of moving
to a new occupation). The variable εi
θ,t − ε
j
θ,t is the idiosyncratic component
of moving costs, which can be negative as easily as it can be positive. For




θ,t < 0), and a worker with a child in the ﬁnal year of high
school may have a non-pecuniary reason to stay in the current location rather










This ensures that the worker’s problem is meaningful; if it was violated, the
worker could ensure inﬁnite utility simply by choosing the sector with the
higher value of ε in each period.
Since what is important for workers’ decisions is the diﬀerence between εi








for a worker currently in sector i, where µi
θ,t is symmetrically distributed
around mean zero, with cdf G(·) and pdf g(·) derived from F(·) and f(·).











t+1 i = X,Y ; j 6= i,
where m
ji
t denotes the fraction of labor force in j at the beginning of t that
moves to i by the end of t, or in other words, the gross ﬂow from j to i.



















The stock of workers in each sector in each period is determined by events
in the previous period. The current labor allocations together with current
product prices determines wages through spot labor-market clearing. Then
each worker learns her ε’s and decides whether to remain in her current sector
or move. In the aggregate, these decisions determine the following period’s
labor allocation.
2.3 Preferences and Expectations.
All agents are risk neutral, have rational expectations and have a common
discount factor β < 1. Further, all workers have identical and homothetic
prferences, which allows us to identify a common cost-of-living index. Letting
good X be the numeraire, let the cost-of-living index be denoted φ(pY), an
increasing function that has an elasticity (by Shepherd’s lemma) equal to good
6Y ’s share in consumption. Thus, the real wage wi
t received by a worker in sector

































Note that an increase in pY will shift wX
t down as a function of Li
t and shift
wY
t up as a function of LY
t .
Each worker makes a location decision in each period to maximize the
expected present discounted value of real wage income, net of common (C)
and idiosyncratic (µ) moving costs. (Henceforth we will drop the worker-
speciﬁc subscript θ, recalling always that the εt and µt terms are worker-speciﬁc
variables.) Let ui(Lt,εt) denote the (maximized) value to a worker of being
in i given Lt = (LX
t ,LY
t ) and idiosyncratic shocks εt = (εX
t ,εY
t ) realized by
the worker. Then vi(Lt) ≡ Eε(ui(Lt,εt)) gives the expected value of ui before
idiosyncratic shocks are realized, but conditional on (Lt).


























i(Lt+1)] − C, (2)
and i 6= j. The expression µi
t is the common value of the net beneﬁt of moving
from i to j. If this is greater than the idiosyncratic cost µ, the worker will
move; otherwise, the worker will stay.













In other words, the value, vi, of being in i is the sum of: (i) the wage,
wi
t, that is received; (ii) the base value, βEtvi(Lt+1), of staying on in i; and
(iii) the additional value, Ω(µi
t), of having the option to move. The expression
Ω(µi
t) is thus interpreted as representing option value.
72.4 Key Equilibrium Conditions.
An equilibrium is a moving rule characterized by a value of (µX
t ,µY
t ) each
period (where a worker in i moves if and only if µ < µi
t), such that the
aggregate movements of workers induced by that rule generate a time path for
wages in each sector that make the proposed moving rule optimal. Here we
derive a key equation that is useful in characterizing equilibrium.








































This is an important relationship for characterising the equilibrium behav-
ior of the model. The interpretation is as follows. The cost of moving (C +µi
t)
for the marginal mover from i to j equals the expected future beneﬁts of being
in j instead of i at time t + 1. This has three components: (i) the expected
wage diﬀerential next period, [w
j
t+1−wi
t+1]; (ii) the diﬀerence in expected con-
tinuation values, captured by the expected cost borne by the marginal mover
from i to j at time t + 1, C + µi
t+1; and (iii) the diﬀerence in option values










Given this and the symmetry of the distribution of µ, the equilibrium


































83 Characteristics of the steady state
Here we will derive properties of the steady state, deferring discussion of
the path to the steady state until the next section.
In discussing steady states, we will naturally drop time subscripts. The
steady-state level of LX will be denoted L
X
. In addition, we will let µ stand
for the steady-state value of µX, and so the steady-state value of µY is given
by −µ−2C. Then L
X




The ﬁrst result is a uniqueness property:
Proposition 1 There is a unique steady-state level of µ and LX.
Proof. Because the mij and L
i
derive uniquely from µ, it suﬃces to prove
uniqueness of the threshold µ. The value of µ is implicitly deﬁned by the
equilibrium condition, which comes directly from (5):




























mY X + mXY L =
G(−µ − 2C)
G(−µ − 2C) + G(µ)
L, (9)
it is easily shown that the right-hand side of (8) is continuous and strictly
decreasing in µ. Since the left-hand side is continuous and increasing on µ on
(−∞,∞), there is a unique solution for µ.
This result demonstrates the striking diﬀerence that the idiosyncratic ef-
fects make for the behavior of the model. If there were only common moving
costs (C > 0) with no idiosyncratic shocks (µ ≡ 0), then there would be a
range of steady states. Any allocation of labor such that |wX−wY| < C(1−β)
would then be a steady state, and this would be a non-degenerate interval of
values of LX.
These diﬀerences are illustrated in Figure 1, which is the standard Ricardo-
Viner diagram adapted to our model. The length of the box is L, the downward-
sloping curve is the marginal value product of labor in X, where the quantity
LX is measured from the left axis, and the upward-sloping curve is the marginal
value product of labor in Y , where the quantity LY is measured from the right
axis. All marginal products are deﬂated by the consumer price index φ(pY).
The top panel shows the unique equilibrium for the Ricardo-Viner model, in
which there are no moving costs at all. The equilibrium point is marked as
9L
X
RV, where wages in the two industries are equalized. The middle panel shows
the range of labor allocations for which it would be unproﬁtable for workers
to move for a model with C > 0 but µ ≡ 0, thus the range of steady states for
a model with common, but not idiosyncratic, moving costs. Thus, in such a
model, there would be hysteresis: The value of LX at which the system comes
to rest would be determined by the initial conditions.
The bottom panel shows the outcome for the present model with both
common and idiosyncratic moving costs. In the present model with gross
ﬂows, every year a trickle of people moves from one cell to another, and this
constant stirring of the pot eventually removes the eﬀect of initial conditions,
yielding a unique steady state.
A second result, concerning wage diﬀerentials, makes it clear that the fric-
tionless model does not predict behavior in the steady state of the model.










but wX > wY. Then:
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X] > 0 since µ
X = β[v
Y − v























Y since Ω(µ) is increasing in µ,
which yields a contradiction.
Thus, we can say that the long-run intersectoral elasticity of labor supply
is ﬁnite. Note that this implies persistent wage diﬀerentials, even in long-run
equilibrium, and even though in each period some fraction of the workers in
each sector move to the other. The point is that if a given sector is to be
larger than the other in the steady state, it must have a lower rate of worker
exit than the other sector does. In order for that to be the case, it must have
a higher wage. Put diﬀerently, suppose for the sake of argument that X and
Y had the same wage and µX = µY while LX > LY. Then the rate of exit
from each sector would be the same, so a larger group of X workers would
arrive in Y each period than the group leaving Y . This would put downward
pressure on the wage in Y , opening up a wage diﬀerential in favor of X, the
larger sector.
10There is also an unambiguous relationship between the steady state of this
model and the Ricardo-Viner equilibrium (which, recall, is the equilibrium of
the model with C,µ ≡ 0). Speciﬁcally, the steady-state intersectoral allocation
of workers always lies somewhere between the Ricardo-Viner model and equal
division of workers between the sectors.
To see this, ﬁrst let the allocation of workers to the X sector in the Ricardo-
Viner model, LX















































Proof. The result follows directly from the labor demand curves being
downward sloping and Proposition 2. Suppose LX
RV > L
2, which means the
demand curves cross to the right of the midway point as shown in Figure
1. If L
X






, then wX would have to be less than wY. This follows from
the deﬁnition of LX
RV and the fact that the labor demand curves are downward
sloping. (Look at the diagram.) But that would contradict the earlier result
that the larger sector (in this case X) has to have the higher wage in steady
state. We thus conclude that L
X
< LX
RV; but this also implies that wX > wY
(again, from the deﬁnition of LX
RV and the fact that labor demand curves slope




An immediate implication is that, unlike a frictionless model, the equilib-
rium does not maximize national income, even at domestic prices, and even in
the steady state. The reason is that each worker has non-pecuniary motives
as well as pecuniary ones, and this has its eﬀect on the aggregate allocation of
labor. It is also clear that this is not an indication of market failure; workers
should consider their non-pecuniary motives when making their decisions.
3.1 Steady-state impact of policy changes.
Let us assume that sector Y is the import-competing sector, and that it
is initially protected by a tariﬀ that raises the domestic price above the world
price. The following two results analyze what happens to steady-state labor
allocations and wages as a result of a change in the tariﬀ.
First, the steady-state impact on labor allocations goes in the same di-
rection as in a model with no mobility costs. For concreteness, consider two
11models, model I (for ‘initial’) and model N (for ‘new’), identical except that
in model N the tariﬀ, and hence pY, is lower than in model I. Denote the





tively, and denote the Ricardo-Viner equilibrium of the two models by b LX
I and
b LX
N respectively. Then, of course, b LX
N > b LX
I . Let the domestic price of Y in




N, and let the values of µ be µI and
µN respectively. We will show that the direction of the steady-state impact of
a labor demand shock is the same in our model as it is in the model with no
mobility costs:













from (9). At the same time:






























I ) + Ω(−µN − 2C) − Ω(µN)
o
(since w
Y is increasing in p
Y while w
















I ) + Ω(−µN − 2C) − Ω(µN)
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I ) + Ω(−µI − 2C) − Ω(µI)
o
(since Ω(−µ − 2C) − Ω(µ) is decreasing in µ and µN ≥ µI)
= µI + C
which is a contradiction.
Finally, as a last comparative static result, we note that wage diﬀerentials
induced by policy persist. When the tariﬀ on Y is removed, not only does the
X-industry wage rise relative to the Y -industry wage in the short run, but as
Proposition 4 shows, it will also do so in the long run.
Proposition 5 Using the notation of the previous problem, given that pY
N <
pY














I ], so from (8)
1 − β
β
[µN + C] + Ω(µN) − Ω(−µN − 2C) ≥
1 − β
β
[µI + C] + Ω(µI) − Ω(−µI − 2C),
which implies µN ≥ µI.





implies that µI > µN, given (9). This yields a contradiction.
In sum, the steady state of the model is unique and qualitatively diﬀerent
from the equilibrium of a frictionless model. It exhibits persistent wage diﬀer-
entials in favor of larger industries, produces more evenly-sized industries than
a frictionless model, and does not maximize GDP. Now, we turn attention to
the whole time-path of adjustment.
4 Dynamic adjustment.
4.1 Preliminaries.
It is in analyzing dynamics and welfare eﬀects along the transition path that
the tools of duality are useful for this model. Here we will see how. First, we
will show the optimization problem that equilibrium solves (as noted above,
it is not maximization of GDP). In the next subsection, we will see how that
establishes basic dynamic properties, and in the next section we will use it to
derive results on distributional eﬀects along the transition path.
A general rule for labor allocation in this model could be characterized by
two functions. The function dXY(LX,µX) gives the probability that a worker
in X will move to Y in the current period, given the current stock LX of
workers in X and the worker’s idiosyncratic cost µX of moving from X to Y .
The function dY X(LX,µY) gives the probability that a worker in Y will move
to X in the current period, given LX and the worker’s idiosyncratic cost µY of
moving from Y to X. These functions deﬁne a feasible allocation rule if and
only if dij ∈ [0,1] over the whole domain. For any given LX
0 , these functions
induce a sequence LX
t for t = 1,∞. The following proposition is proven (in
a more general form) as Proposition 1 in Cameron, Chaudhuri and McLaren
(2007):
Proposition 6 Any equilibrium maximizes:
P∞
t=0 βt[QX(LX






t ,µX)g(µX)dµX − LY
t
R
(µY + C)dY X(LX
t ,µY)g(µY)dµY]
(10)
within the class of feasible allocation rules dXY and dY X, subject to LX
0 and LY
0
given, and with Li
t determined by the choice of the dij functions for i = X,Y ,
t > 0.
Therefore, studying optimization problem (10) can tell us about the equilib-
rium. Note that this is a dynamic analogue to the revenue function maximized
by equilibrium in a static neoclassical trade model (see Dixit and Norman
1980, Ch. 2). Let V (LX,LY) denote the maximized value of the objective
13function (10) from an initial condition of LX workers in X and LY work-
ers in Y . Equivalently, since L is ﬁxed, we can write the value function as
W(LX) ≡ V (LX,L − LX).
Since the problem is stationary, the usual dynamic programming logic will
apply, and the function W can be computed by solving a Bellman equation.
Conditional on the domestic relative price pY, for any bounded function f W on





































t + dY X(LX
t ,µ)(L − LX
t )}g(µ)dµ. The
Bellman equation is then T(W;pY) = W. It is easy to show that T satisﬁes
the usual Blackwell properties with respect to W, and that as a result T has a
unique ﬁxed point, which can be found as the unique uniform limit of iterations
on the Bellman equation starting from any bounded candidate function.
The following observation is helpful in characterizing the system’s dynam-
ics, and is also proven as Proposition 5 in Cameron, Chaudhuri and McLaren
(2007):
Proposition 7 The function W is strictly concave.
This result tells us that the equilibrium is unique, since in strictly concave
optimization problems the optimum is unique. It also tells us that the function
W 0(LX) is strictly decreasing in LX. The following tells us that the value of
this function is always equal to vX − vY, which is very useful for analyzing
dynamics, as will be seen shortly.
Proposition 8 In equilibrium at each date vX − vY is equal to W 0.
Proof. First, note that in the optimization it is never optimal to have
workers moving from i to j and at the same time other workers with lower
values of µ who are remaining in i. (In that case, an equal number of work-
ers from the two groups could have their actions reversed, leaving the future
allocation of workers unchanged but reducing aggregate idiosyncratic moving
costs.) Therefore, in an optimal allocation there is for each value of LX at each
date a number µX such that dXY(LX,µ) = 1 if µ < µX and dXY(LX,µ) = 0 if
µ > µX. Simlarly, there is for each value of LX at each date a number µY such
that dY X(LX,µ) = 1 if µ < µY and dXY(LX,µ) = 0 if µ > µY. This means




































t )(L − L
X
t ))].
The ﬁrst-order conditions for this with respect to µX and µY are
µ
X










But then from (2), the result follows.
This tells us that in equilibrium, the attractiveness of either sector relative
to the other is a strictly decreasing function of the number of workers who
are located in that sector. Now we can use this to analyze the economy’s
dynamics.
4.2 Gradual adjustment to unanticipated changes.
The preceding analysis can be used to show a number of properties of the
model’s dynamic adjustment. First, labor market adjustments to any change,
such as terms of trade shocks or policy changes, will be sluggish. In particular,
suppose that the economy is in a steady state associated with an initial value
of pY, say p0. If a one-time shock occurs (say, elimination of the tariﬀ on good
Y ) that results in a new value of pY, say p00, the economy will not reach the
steady state associated with p00 in ﬁnite time.
To see this, consider Figure 2. This illustrates the ﬁrst-order condition
(2), or equivalently, (13), for choice of µY
t and hence of LX
t+1 given the current
value of LX
t . The solid upward sloping curve indicates the locus of points
(LX
t+1,µY
t + C) such that LX
t+1 = G(µY
t )(L − LX
t ) + (1 − G(−µY
t − 2C))LX
t ,
which we can write as LX
t+1(LX
t ,µY
t ). One can, thus, interpret it as the marginal
cost curve for the supply of X-workers: the height is the moving cost for the
marginal worker moving to X, given that the total number who wind up in X
at the end of this period is equal to LX
t+1. The downward sloping curve gives
β(vX
t+1 − vY
t+1) = βW 0(LX
t+1). This can be interpreted as the marginal beneﬁt
of moving a worker from Y to X. Given LX
t , the values of LX
t+1 and of µY
t are
determined as the intersection of these two curves.
Now, note that if C > 0, increasing LX
t by ∆ units shifts the marginal
cost curve to the right at each point by an amount strictly between 0 and ∆.
Since the marginal beneﬁt curve is strictly decreasing, this implies an increase
15in LX
t+1 that lies strictly between 0 and ∆. This can be summarized in Figure
3, which shows the transition function that gives LX
t+1 as a function of LX
t .
Provided that C > 0, this curve must be strictly increasing, with a slope
strictly less than 1. Thus, there is a unique steady state, and if the system
begins at a point other than the steady state, it will move toward it without
ever reaching or overshooting it.
This provides the result. For example, if the system is initially at a steady
state with a high tariﬀ that is expected to continue permanently, and then
the tariﬀ is suddenly removed never to be restored, then the system will move
toward the new steady state each period, attaining it only in the limit.
Gradual labor-market adjustment to external shocks and policy changes,
and the persistent wage diﬀerentials that they imply, have been documented
empirically by, among others, Topel (1986), Blanchard & Katz (1992) and
Rappaport (2000). They appear in the model of Davidson and Matusz (2001),
due to re-training and search delays and exogenous rates of individual job
separation. They can also be rationalized by convex training costs for labor (as
in Karp and Paul (1994) or Dehejia (1997), in analogy with convex adjustment
costs for capital as in Mussa (1978)). Here, they result from the presence of
time-varying idiosyncratic shocks to workers (even though those shocks are
serially uncorrelated). Even if a worker is suﬀering low wages as a result of loss
of protection to that worker’s sector, it will often be in that worker’s interest
to wait until her personal moving costs are suﬃciently low before leaving the
sector.
4.3 Anticipatory adjustment to pre-announced changes.
Another feature of the model’s dynamics is anticipatory adjustment. Sup-
pose the economy is in an initial steady state with a tariﬀ on imported good Y ,
and a domestic price of pY = p0. At time t = 0, the government announces a
surprise policy change—elimination of the tariﬀ—starting at some date t∗ > 0.
At that date and thenceforth, the domestic price of Y will be equal to the world
price, p00 < p0. We will see that anticipatory net outﬂows of labor from sector
Y will begin immediately from the time of the announcement.
Although the environment is no longer stationary as in the previous sec-
tions, the logic of Proposition 6 still applies, and the perfect-foresight equi-
librium still solves the planner’s problem (10) with pY = p0 for t = 0,...,t∗
and pY = p00 for t > t∗. The value function will, however, depend on the
date as well as the current labor allocation, and it is useful to write it as
W t(LX;p0,p00,t∗) to keep track of the parameters of the problem.
Note from (1) that ceteris paribus, a rise in pY will raise the real wage in the
Y sector and lower it in the X sector, or wX
2 (LX,pY) < 0 and wY
2 (L−LX,pY) >
0. This leads to the following.
Lemma 1 Assume that C > 0. (i) Let f W be a bounded, concave, and diﬀeren-
tiable function on [0,L]. Then ∂T(f W;p00)(LX)/∂LX > ∂T(f W;p0)(LX)/∂LX.
16(ii) Let f W and c W be bounded, concave, and diﬀerentiable functions on [0,L],
with f W 0 > c W 0 everywhere. Then, for any value of pY, ∂T(f W;pY)(LX)/∂LX >
∂T(c W;pY)(LX)/∂LX for any t.
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(i) Comparing p0 with p00, (13) shows that the optimal choice of µY
t for a
given LX
t will be the same for both. This implies that the only diﬀerence in
(14) is in the ﬁrst two terms, which take a higher value for p00 since the X
wage is higher and the Y wage is lower. This proves the result. (ii) If we
replace c W with f W, then in the ﬁrst-order condition for the optimization in
T(f W;pY)(LX
t ), the marginal beneﬁt curve shifts up (recall Figure 2). Thus,
for any LX
t , we have a rise in the value of µY
t that is chosen. The ﬁrst two terms
of (14) are unchanged. The derivative of the last three terms with respect to
µY
t is equal to −G(−µY
t − 2C) − G(µY
t ) + 1, which by the symmetry of the
distribution of µ is equal to G(µY
t +2C)−G(µY
t ) > 0. Therefore, the value of
(14) has gone up, proving the result.
Now, consider a model in which pY
t ≡ p0 forever and call it model I (for
‘initial’), with value function W I and steady-state value of LX equal to LX
I .
Consider in the same way a model in which pY
t ≡ p00 forever and call it model N
(for ‘new’), with value function W N and steady-state value of LX equal to LX
N.
The two comparative statics results just derived, applied to the recursions on
the Bellman operator T, imply that W I
1(LX) < W N




Now, return to the problem of the model with the announced policy change
at time t∗. From time t∗ on, the value function and the transition function
mapping LX
t into LX
t+1 and will be exactly as they are in model N. Consider
date t∗ − 1. For a given value of LX, the value function for date t = t∗ − 1
is given by T(W N;p0)(LX) (the next–period value function is W N, but the












for any LX. The ﬁrst inequality results from part (ii) of the Lemma because
W I = T(W I;p0), and W I
1 < W N
1 . The second inequality results from part (i)
17of the Lemma because p0 > p00. However, referring again to the ﬁrst-order
condition for the choice of LX
t+1 given LX
t (see Figure 2), we see that (15)
implies that the transition function for period t∗ − 1 lies strictly in between
the transition function for model I and that for model N. This is illustrated
in Figure 4. By the same logic, the transition function for period t∗ − 2 must
lie strictly between that for t∗ − 1 and that for model I, and so on. Then
if we were already in a steady state of model I and it was announced (to
everone’s surprise) at date 0 that the tariﬀ would be removed at date t∗, the
dynamics of the system would follow the path indicated in Figure 4, drawn for
the assumption that t∗ = 3. Adjustment toward the new steady state would
begin immediately at date 0, and would continue permanently, always moving
toward the new steady state but never reaching it.
Of course, anticipatory labor adjustments also imply anticipatory wage
changes. In particular, anticipatory outﬂows from Y prior to the actual tariﬀ
removal will progressively raise wY up to the time of the policy change, at
which point it will fall discretely, and will progressively push down wX up to
the time of the policy change, at which point it will rise discretely due to the
drop in the consumer’s price index. This has obvious implications for empirical
analyses of the impact of trade liberalization on wages.
In particular, suppose that a researcher obtains data on wages and employ-
ment levels at dates t∗−1 and t∗+1, and compares the values before and after
the liberalization. If the diﬀerences thus observed are interpreted to be the
eﬀects of the liberalization, then because the anticipatory eﬀects are omitted,
the study will greatly overestimate the wage eﬀects and underestimate the
sectoral employment eﬀects.
5 Welfare and Incidence.
A large part of the reason for studying the workings of a model with labor
mobility costs is to reﬁne our understanding of who gains and who is hurt
from a change in trade policy. Here we will look at two diﬀerent angles of
this question. First, a simple envelope result shows how the eﬀect on a given
worker can be expressed in terms of ﬂow probabilities and changes in wages
only. This result shows the importance of gross ﬂows in analyzing incidence,
which is ignored in the vast majority of empirical work. Second, we derive
some results on how delayed trade liberalization can aﬀect who gains and who
loses from a reform.
5.1 An envelope result.
Return again to the case with constant pY. Consider again an unannounced
and permanent change in tariﬀ, which changes the value of pY once and for
18all. Returning to (3), we can see that the change in the utility of a worker in




















t denote the equilibrium values of the wage, worker’s
utility, and moving threshold in sector i and at date t respectively. Noting





















































t is the probability that a worker who was in i at time 0 will be in k
at time t. Thus, despite the moving costs, a properly constructed discounted
sum of wages alone, using gross ﬂows to average across sectors, is suﬃcient for
evaluating incidence.
Note again that this has implications for empirical work. It suggests that
looking at change in an industry’s wages is not enough to tell whether workers
in that industry have beneﬁtted or not. In particular, it is quite possible to
construct examples in which a drop in tariﬀ lowers wages in sector Y in the
short run and in the long run, and yet every worker in the economy, beneﬁts,
including those in Y .2 The reason is that real wages in X rise by enough,
and the economy is ﬂuid enough, that current Y workers expect to make up
in future employment in X for what they have lost in Y . This also stands in
stark contrast to the convex-adjustment cost approach (Karp and Paul, 1994;
Dehejia, 1997); in equilibrium in those models, a Y -worker must be indiﬀerent
between leaving Y and remaining there permanently, and so would deﬁnitely
be worse oﬀ if Y wages were to fall permanently.
5.2 The eﬀects of policy delay on incidence.
Trade liberalization measures are usually phased in over time. For example,
the elimination of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement in the Uruguay round was
2For example, consider a model with Ricardian technology. If Qi(Li
t) ≡ AiLi
t for positive
constants Ai, i = X,Y , then wX = AX/φ(pY ) and wY = pY AY /φ(pY ). Suppose that the
two goods are perfect substitutes in consumption so that φ(pY ) ≡ min{1,pY }. Then for
pY > 1, wX = AX and wY = pY AY , while for pY ≤ 1, wX = AX/pY and wY = AY . Then
if pY is initially slightly above 1 but then drops to a point well below 1, wY will fall slightly
but by letting pY fall suﬃciently close to 0, wX can be made arbitrarily large. Eventually,
Y -workers will value the option of moving to X enough to compensate them for their small
current wage loss.
19scheduled to be phased in over ten years, with most of the reduction loaded
at the end of the phase-in period. One reason for this is to soften the eﬀects
of the reform on workers likely to be hurt by it, giving them time to adjust
and perhaps removing an incentive to oppose the reform politically. This
motive is studied by Dehejia (2003), in a Heckscher-Ohlin model with convex
adjustment costs for workers (and zero steady-state ﬂows of workers). In that
model, it is shown that gradual phase-in can bring all workers behind a trade
liberalization that would otherwise have been opposed by import-competing
workers, making the reform politically feasible.
We will here study the eﬀect of delayed trade liberalization in the present
model. To study a simple version of the problem that makes the mechanisms
clear, we focus on a stark liberalization that brings the economy from autarchy
to free trade. Beginning from an autarchic steady state, the opening of trade
may either occur immediately or be announced (with full commitment) to
occur at a later date. In contrast to Dehejia, we ﬁnd that delay does not, in
general, soften the blow of trade liberalization to workers. What it does do,
if the period of delay is long enough, is to unite all workers, so that they all
either beneﬁt from trade or lose from it. To anticipate, it turns out that if
an increase in labor supply increases the economy’s long-run relative supply
of export goods (as it does in Dehejia’s model), then delay fosters uniﬁcation
of workers behind free trade, but if an increase in labor supply decreases long-
run relative supply of export goods, delay fosters uniﬁcation of workers in
opposition to free trade.
Consider an economy that is as of period 0 in an autarchic steady-state
with a relative price of good Y given by p = p0. At date 0 it is announced that
the economy will be opened up to free trade as of date t∗ (which could be equal
to zero, representing the case of unanticipated liberalization). Suppose that
the world relative price of good Y is given by p = p00. It is useful to rewrite the
period-t value function for the planner’s problem that the equilibrium solves as
W t(LX
t ,LY
t ;p0,p00,t∗). (Of course, the value function is not stationary before
t∗, although it will be afterward, hence the time superscript for the value
function.) Let t∗ = ∞ represent the case in which no trade liberalization is
announced.
It is straightforward to check from the envelope theorem applied to the
Bellman equation for the planner’s problem that the payoﬀ to an individ-
ual worker in the X sector at the beginning of period 0, just after the pol-
icy announcement, is equal to vX
0 = W 0
1(LX
t ,LY
t ;p0,p00,t∗), or the marginal
value of an X worker from the planner’s point of view. Similarly, the pay-
oﬀ to a Y worker is given by vY
0 = W 0
2. Given that, the question of the
value of advance notice is essentially the question of whether or not an in-










t ;p0,p00,t∗) − W 0
i (LX
t ,LY
t ;p0,p0,∞) for i = 1,2. Call this diﬀerence
an i worker’s ‘willingness to consent.’ It is diﬃcult to obtain general results on




20or the derivative of a worker’s payoﬀ with respect to the world price, evalu-




t ;p0,p0,t∗) − W 0
i (LX
t ,LY
t ;p0,p0,∞) = 0) one has signed the i
worker’s willingness to consent in an interval for p00 that includes p0. That is
the approach taken here.
Denote the equilibrium employment in sector i at time t, as a function
of initial labor stocks, by Li
t(LX
0 ,LY




0 ). Deﬁne qi
t(LX
0 ,LY
0 ) and qi
∞(LX
0 ,LY
0 ) respectively as
output in the i sector at time t and in the steady state. (In general these
functions would be conditioned on p0,p00, and t∗ as well as LX
0 , LY
0 , but we will
need to evaluate these functions only at the point p00 = p0, so these additional
arguments will be suppressed.) The following will be useful.




(i) The functions LX
t and LY
t are diﬀerentiable in (LX
0 ,LY
0 ).











are all non-negative, and LX
t1 + LY
t1 = 1∀t > 0. Further, LX
t1 is decreasing in t.
(iii) The derivatives LX
t2 and LY
t2 are all non-negative, and LY
t2+LX
t2 = 1∀t >
0. Further, LX
t2is increasing in t.
(iv) Li
t1 → Li
∞1 as t → ∞, for i = X,Y .
Parts (i) and (iv) are technical preliminaries. The result in (iv) requires
proof, since even when a series of functions converges uniformly to a limit func-
tion, in general the sequence of derivatives does not converge to the derivative
of the limit series. In this case the result follows because the functions are
solutions to an optimisation problem. Parts (ii) and (iii) follow directly from
the model’s dynamics. For example, if one was to add some workers to X in
period 0, that would result in more X workers in each period, but the number
of X workers would fall over time, as workers reallocate toward the Y sector.
With a slight abuse of notation, we will write LX
01 = 1, LX
02 = 0, LY
01 = 0, and
LY
02 = 1.
Henceforth, we will assume that the planner’s value function is twice con-
tinuously diﬀerentiable in all arguments.
With this notation, the eﬀect on the payoﬀ of a worker in X is:
∂vX
0







































































where α ≡ p0φ0(p0)/φ(p0) is the share of good Y in autarchic consumption
expenditure.3 Note that this provides a simple way of analyzing the eﬀects of
delay; the only eﬀect of an increase in t∗ on this exression is to eliminate some
to the terms from the summation. This is the key to the results that follow.
Since QX
t1 is decreasing in t and QY
t1 is increasing in t, Bt is increasing
in t. Since α
p0(1−α) is the autarchic steady-state ratio of Y consumption to X
consumption (and hence the ratio of production as well), B∞ ≡ limt→∞ Bt has











. Put diﬀerently, B∞ > 0 if and only if an increase
in the economy’s total labor supply would increase QY
∞/QX
∞ at a ﬁxed world
price of p00 = p0, and B∞ < 0 if an increase in labor supply would decrease
QY
∞/QX
∞. In addition, QY
01 = 0, since an exogenous increase in the stock of
labor in one sector cannot have a contemporaneous eﬀect on output in the
other sector. Thus, B0 < 0.
As a result, if B∞ < 0, then Bt < 0 for all t, and
∂vX
0
∂p00 |p00=p0 < 0. However, if
B∞ > 0, then Bt is negative for t below some threshold and positive for t above
the threshold. The implication is that ∃t such that if t∗ ≥ t,
∂vX
0
∂p00 |p00=p0 > 0.










where Dt ≡ (1 − α)QY
t2 − α
p0QX
t2. Clearly, since QX
t2 = 0, QX
t2 is increasing
in t, and QY
t2 is decreasing in t, while QX
t2 and QY
t2 are non-negative for all
t, we can conclude that D0 > 0 and that Dt is decreasing in t. Further, by





∞2, we conclude that D∞ = B∞. This all







By extension of the logic just used, if D∞ < 0, then ∃t such that if t∗ ≥ t,
∂vY
0
∂p00 |p00=p0 < 0. Further, if B∞ = D∞ = 0, then Bt < 0 < Dt for all t, and
∂vX
0
∂p00 |p00=p0 < 0 <
∂vY
0
∂p00 |p00=p0 regardless of t∗.
In addition, since B0 < 0 < D0, it is clear that increasing t∗ from 0 to 1, by




∂p00 |p00=p0 and decreases
∂vY
0
∂p00 |p00=p0. Thus, workers in the export sector
are hurt by a bit of delay, while workers in the import competing sector beneﬁt
from a bit of delay.
This can all be summarized as follows. The ﬁrst proposition treats the case
with B∞ = D∞ 6= 0, and the second treats the case with B∞ = D∞ = 0.
3The switch in the order of diﬀerentiation is analogous to the demonstration that in a
static trade model derivatives of factor prices with respect to output derivates is dual to the
derivative of output with respect to factor prices, as in Dixit and Norman (1980, pp.54-55).
22Proposition 9 Suppose that, at the autarchy relative price p0, steady state
relative supply of the export good is increased [decreased] by an increase in
labor supply. Then, there is an open interval containing p0 such that if the
world price p00 is in that interval:
(i) Workers in the export [import-competing] sector as of period 0 will ben-
eﬁt from [be hurt by] immediate unanticipated opening of trade.
(ii) The net beneﬁt to workers in the import-competing sector from the
opening up of trade is strictly less than the beneﬁt to export sector workers,
whether the opening is delayed or not.
(iii) A one-period delay hurts export-sector workers and beneﬁts import-
competing workers.
(iv) A suﬃciently long delay before the opening of trade will make workers
in both sectors net beneﬁciaries [net losers] from trade.
Proposition 10 Suppose that, at the autarchy relative price p0, steady state
relative supply of the export good is unchanged at the margin by an increase
in labor supply. Then there is an open interval containing p0 such that if the
world price p00 is in that interval:
(i) Workers in the export sector as of period 0 will beneﬁt from the opening
of trade, whether it is delayed or not.
(i) Workers in the import-competing sector as of period 0 will be hurt by
the opening of trade, whether it is delayed or not.
(iii) A one-period delay hurts export-sector workers and beneﬁts import-
competing workers.
Some examples. Four simple special cases illustrate the diﬀerent eﬀects
delay can have. For all examples, assume that p00 < p0, so that Y is the
import good, and that the diﬀerence between the world price and the domestic
autarchy price is small enough that the propositions apply. (As a result, sector-




(i) Ricardian technology. If Qi(Li
t) ≡ AiLi
t for positive constants Ai, i =
X,Y , an increase in total labor supply will result in an equiproportionate
increase in output of both sectors. (Note that wX and wY are both independent
of labor supplies, and so, by (8), µ is unchanged by a change in labor supply.)
Therefore, B∞ = 0, and in this case delay has no role: export sector workers
beneﬁt from trade and import-competing workers are hurt by it, regardless of
t∗.4
(ii) Inelastic import-competing labor demand. Suppose that both X and Y
are produced by a sector-speciﬁc asset in ﬁxed supply (KX and KY respec-
tively) together with labor. Suppose further that the production function for Y
is Leontieﬀ: QY(KY,LY) = min{KY,LY}, and that the production function
4Recall that these are ‘local’ results, in the sense that they depend on p00 being close to
p0. On the other hand, where p00 is substantially below p0, workers in both industries can
beneﬁt from trade (even though the real wage for sector Y falls both in the short run and
the long run), as illustrated in Footnote 2.
23for X is CES: QX(LX,KX) = ((LX)ρ+(KX)ρ)1/ρ, with ρ < 1, ρ 6= 0 (implying
an elasticity of substitution equal to 1/(1−ρ)). In this case, QY
t1 = QY
t2 = 0∀t.
Therefore, Bt,Dt ≤ 0∀t, with strict inequality for t > 0, so both groups of
worker will beneﬁt from trade with or without delay. The interpretation is
that the increased labor demand in the export sector forces wages up in the
import-competing sector because of its inelastic labor demand, beneﬁtting all
workers.5
(iii) Inelastic export-sector labor demand. Now, reverse the production
functions for the two sectors. In this case, QX
t1 = QX
t2 = 0∀t. Therefore,
Bt,Dt ≥ 0∀t, with strict inequality for t > 0, so both groups of worker will be
hurt by trade with or without delay. The interpretation is that the reduced
labor demand in the import-competing sector forces wages down in the ex-
port sector because of its inelastic labor demand, hurting all workers. In this
example, all of the gains from trade are captured by the owners of the ﬁxed
factors.
(iv) An example in which delay tips the scales in favor of trade. Now con-
sider a general CES speciﬁcation, in which Qi(Li,Ki) = ((Li)ρi + (Ki)ρi)1/ρi,
i = X,Y , with ρi < 1, ρi 6= 0. Example (ii) shows that with any ﬁnite ρX
and with ρY suﬃciently large and negative, import-competing workers strictly
beneﬁt from an unannounced liberalization. Example (iii) shows that with
any ﬁnite ρY and with ρX suﬃciently large and negative, import-competing
workers are strictly hurt by an unannounced liberalization. Choose any two
such parameter pairs, and connect them with a curve in (ρX,ρY) space. There
must be a point on the curve at which import-competing workers are indiﬀer-
ent between a sudden trade opening and the autarchic steady state. For this
parameter pair, by part (ii) of Proposition 9, export workers are strict beneﬁ-
ciaries of sudden trade. In addition, export workers will remain net beneﬁcia-
ries of trade if the opening is delayed (B∞ must be negative, because in order
for Y workers to be indiﬀerent, D∞ must be negative; but then Bt < 0∀t).
Furthermore, since D0 > 0 and Dt is decreasing in t, any delay will make
the Y workers strict beneﬁciaries of trade. Thus, an immediate liberalization
would beneﬁt X workers but not Y workers, but a delayed liberalization would
strictly beneﬁt both classes of worker. (A slight perturbation of the (ρX,ρY)
pair could then make the Y workers stictly hurt by immediate trade opening,
making them strict beneﬁciaries of delayed opening.)
The interpretation of this result is as follows. An unexpected trade opening
pushes down the real wages of Y workers immediately, while pushing up the
real wages of X workers. The Y workers move only gradually to take advantage
of the higher X wages because of the moving costs. However, if the trade
opening is announced in advance, Y workers who happen to have low moving
costs at the moment begin moving to X in anticipation. This makes Y workers
more scarce, pushing up wages for those who do not move (while pushing X
5This is analogous to a parallel result on the role of elasticities of substitution in Mussa’s
(1974) static Ricardo-Viner model.
24wages down), even though no change in output prices has yet occurred. If the
elasticity of labor demand in the Y sector is suﬃciently low, this anticipatory
wage increase is the dominant eﬀect.
(v) An example in which delay tips the scales against trade. Exactly the
same logic as in (iv) can be used to construct a case in which export sec-
tor workers are indiﬀerent between immediate trade and the autarchic steady
state. In this case, by part (ii) of Proposition 9, import-competing workers are
strictly hurt by trade whether it is delayed or not (since D∞ must be positive,
because in order for X workers to be indiﬀerent, B∞ must be positive; but
then Dt > 0∀t). Furthermore, since B0 < 0 and Bt is increasing in t, any
delay will make the X workers strictly harmed by trade. Thus, in the event of
an immediate liberalization, workers would be divided over trade, while delay
would unite all workers in their opposition. (Again, a slight perturbation of
the example can make X workers strict beneﬁciaries of immediate trade.)
The interpretation of this example is as follows. From the point of view of
the X workers, immediate trade has three eﬀects. It lowers real wages in the
Y sector; it provides an immediate increase in real wages in the X sector; and
it pushes a certain number of Y workers out of the Y sector and into the X
sector over time, pushing X wages down. If labor demand in X is suﬃciently
inelastic, the X wage will be lower in the long run than it was under autarchy.
Thus, in this example, for a X worker, the beneﬁt from free trade is short-lived,
and must be weighed against a long-run cost. On the other hand, if the trade
opening is announced in advance, Y workers begin moving into X right away,
pushing X wages down even before output prices change. Thus, X workers lose
the beneﬁt of the short-run wage increase that they would have enjoyed under
unanticipated trade, and jump immediately to the long-run cost of increased
competition from former Y workers.
These examples serve to illustrate the range of possible outcomes. Except
in the knife-edge case with B∞ = D∞ = 0, delay tends to make workers
unanimous in their stance toward trade, but whether it is a positive or negative
stance depends on the relative responsiveness of labor demand in the two
sectors. Of course, whether delay in any given real world liberalization event
is likely to turn workers into beneﬁciaries or victims of trade is an empirical
matter. Artu¸ c, Chaudhuri and McLaren (2007) simulate equilibria of this
model for a range of parameters in order to illustrate these points and to
explore the magnitudes of delay required to achieve unanimity of workers. For
middling values of the elasticity of substitution, unanimity can require decades
of delay.
6 Conclusion.
We have studied a simple trade model with costly labor mobilty and idiosyn-
cratic moving-cost shocks. The model is shown to have non-trivial dynamics,
including gradual adjustment and anticipatory eﬀects, resulting solely from
25ﬁxed moving costs plus time-varying idiosyncratic moving cost shocks to indi-
vidual workers. A key conclusion is that the steady state does not resemble a
model with frictionless labor mobility. Speciﬁcally, intersectoral wage diﬀeren-
tials persist permanently, making workers more expensive in larger sectors. In
addition, trade liberalization lowers the long-run wage in the import-competing
sector relative to the export sector, and delaying liberalization reduces the
diﬀerence between the eﬀect of liberalization on export-sector and on import-
competing workers.
Thus, the trade economist’s habit of assuming that a frictionless model will
be a good predictor of long-run trade eﬀects is called into question.
7 Appendix.




(i) The functions LX
t and LY
t are diﬀerentiable in (LX
0 ,LY
0 ).











are all non-negative, and LX
t1 + LY
t1 = 1∀t > 0. Further, LX
t1 is decreasing in t.
(iii) The derivatives LX
t2 and LY
t2 are all non-negative, and LY
t2+LX
t2 = 1∀t >
0. Further, LX
t2is increasing in t.
(iv) Li
t1 → Li
∞1 as t → ∞, for i = X,Y .
Proof. First, note that since µX
t = −µY
t −2C, once µX
t has been speciﬁed,
µY
t can be computed from it, and then LX
t+1 and LY




t by (7). We can thus write LX




t . Note that it is a strictly decreasing function, allowing us to
deﬁne its inverse: µX(LX
t+1;LX
t ,LY
t ), which is clearly diﬀerentiable.
Part (i) can be seen as follows. We can write the planner’s ﬁrst-order














































The diﬀerentiability of LX
1 can be inferred by applying the Implicit Func-
tion Theorem to this equation for t = 0. Given the diﬀerentiability of LX
t0 ,
the diﬀerentiability of LX
t0+1 can be inferred by applying the same logic to the
equation for t = t0. Thus, the result follows by induction.
Parts (ii) and (iii) simply follow from our results on the dynamics of ad-







































t+1,1 + β(V12 − V22) − µ
X
3 ,
where the derivatives of µX
1 are evaluated at (LX
t+1;LX
t ,LY
t ) and the derivatives
of the value function are evaluated at (LX
t+1,LY
t+1). Now, since LX
t1 is positive
but decreasing in t, it must take a limit, say, η. Taking limits of this equation
as t → ∞, we ﬁnd:
η =




3 − β[(V11 − V12 − V21 + V22)
,
where the derivatives of µX are evaluated at (LX
∞;LX
∞,LY
∞) and the derivatives
of the value function are evaluated at (LX
∞,LY
∞). Now, noting that the steady-





















0 (and thus LX
∞1+LY
∞1 =
1), solve for LX
∞1. But this then yields LX
∞1 = η.
References
[1] Artu¸ c, Erhan, Shubham Chaudhuri and John McLaren (Forthcoming).
“Delay and Dynamics in Trade Liberalization: Simulation Results.”
Forthcoming, Journal of International Economics.
[2] Artu¸ c, Erhan, Shubham Chaudhuri, and John McLaren (2007). “Trade
Shocks and Labor Adjustment: A Structural Empirical Approach.”
NBER Working Paper #13465 (October).
[3] Blanchard, Olivier J. and Lawrence F. Katz (1992). “Regional Evolu-
tions.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 1, pp.1-61.
[4] Cameron, Stephen, Shubham Chaudhuri, and John McLaren (2007).
“Trade Shocks and Labor Adjustment: Theory.” NBER Working Paper
#13463 (October).
[5] Davidson, Carl, Lawrence Martin and Steven J. Matusz (1999). “Trade
and Search Generated Unemployment.” Journal of International Eco-
nomics 48:2 (August), pp. 271-99.
[6] Davidson, Carl and Steven J. Matusz (2001). “On Adjustment Costs.”
Michigan State University Working Paper.
[7] Davidson, Carl and Steven J. Matusz, (2004). International Trade and
Labor Markets: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications. Kalamazoo,
Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
27[8] Davidson, Carl and Steven J. Matusz, (2004). International Trade and
Labor Markets: Theory, Evidence, and Policy Implications. Kalamazoo,
Michigan: W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research.
[9] Dehejia, Vivek (2002). “Will Gradualism work when Shock Therapy
Doesn’t?” Economics & Politics 15:1 (November), p. 33-59.
[10] Dixit, Avinash (1993). “Prices of Goods and Factors in a Dynamic
Stochastic Economy.” In Wilfred J. Ethier, Elhanan Helpman and J. Pe-
ter Neary (eds.), Theory, Policy and Dynamics in International Trade:
Essays in Honor of Ronald W. Jones. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press.
[11] Dixit, Avinash and Victor Norman (1980).Theory of International Trade.
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
[12] Dixit, Avinash and Rafael Rob (1994). “Switching Costs and Sectoral
Adjustments in General Equilibrium with Uninsured Risk.” Journal of
Economic Theory 62, pp. 48-69.
[13] Feenstra, Robert C. and Tracy R. Lewis (1994), “Trade Adjustment Assis-
tance and Pareto Gains from Trade,” Journal of International Economics,
XXXVI, pp. 201-22.
[14] Freund, Caroline, and John McLaren (1999). “On the Dynamics of Trade
Diversion: Evidence from Four Trade Blocks”. International Finance Dis-
cussion Paper 637, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System,
Washington, D.C.
[15] Jones, Ronald I. (1971). “A Three-factor Model in Theory, Trade and
History.” In Trade, Balance of Payments and Growth: Essays in Honor
of C.P. Kindleberger, ed. by Bhagwati et. al. Amsterdam: North Holland.
[16] Jovanovic, Boyan and Robert Moﬃtt (1991). “An Estimate of a Sectoral
Model of Labor Mobility,” Journal of Political Economy, 98:4, pp. 827-
852.
[17] Karp, Larry and Thierry Paul (1994). “Phasing In and Phasing Out
Protectionism with Costly Adjustment of Labour,” Economic Journal
104:427 (November), pp. 1379-92.
[18] Magee, Stephen P. (1989). “Three Simple Tests of the Stolper-Samuelson
Theorem.” Ch. 7 in Stephen P. Magee, William A. Brock, and Leslie
Young, Black Hole Tariﬀs and Endogenous Policy Theory, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1989.
[19] Matsuyama, Kiminori (1992). “A Simple Model of Sectoral Adjustment.”
Review of Economic Studies, 59, pp. 375-88.
28[20] Mussa, M. (1974). “Tariﬀs and the Distribution of Income: The Impor-
tance of Factor Speciﬁcity, Substitutability, and Intensity in the Short and
Long Run.” Journal of Political Economy 82:6 (November/December),
pp.1191-1203.
[21] Mussa, Michael (1978). “Dynamic Adjustment in the Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson Model,” Journal of Political Economy, 86:5, pp. 775-91.
[22] Rappaport, Jordan (2000). “Why are Population Flows so Persistent?”
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City Working Paper RWP 99-13.
[23] Slaughter, Matthew J. (1998). ”International Trade and Labor-Market
Outcomes,” Economic Journal, 108:450 (September), pp. 1452-1462.
[24] Topel, Robert H. (1986) “Local Labor Markets.” Journal of Political







































































































































Transition function: Model I.
Transition function: Model N.
Transition function: Time t*-1.
Transition function: Time t*-2.
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